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Abstract. Just as in human societies, for which we have developed reasonably
effective systems to organise and manage interactions in such a way as to min-
imise the impact of erroneous or malicious behaviour, we also need to find ways
to organise and manage computational entities in order to mitigate their potential
deleterious effect on computational systems. In this paper, therefore, we analyse
the role of trust, organisations and norms in a motivation-based view of agency
that seeks to regulate behaviour, and illustrate some of these issues with aspects
of several projects, including the CONTRACT project, concerned with electronic
contract-based e-business systems.
1 Introduction
As information and communications technologies have progressed, there has been a
change of focus from individual standalone computers to large-scale interconnected
and open distributed systems. In fact, to a large extent, this move has already occurred,
with such interconnectedness and openness becoming increasingly prevalent. While the
benefits are myriad, for example in enabling dynamic service composition and virtual
organisations, and supporting developments contributing to the realisation of ambient
intelligence and Grid computing, there are also some important potential problems. In
particular, little consideration has been given to problems analogous to those in human
societies, where we need to consider the issues surrounding the use of regulations and
their absence, of opportunistic and malicious behaviour.
Just as in human societies, for which we have developed reasonably effective sys-
tems to manage and organise interactions in such a way as to minimise the impact of
erroneous or malicious behaviour, we also need to find ways to organise and manage
computational entities in order to mitigate their potential deleterious effect on com-
putational systems. While some work has been done on each of these concerns, their
combination in large-scale open systems has not been addressed, yet this is a fundamen-
tal requirement if the visions of Grid computing and ambient intelligence, for example,
are to be realised.
In this paper, therefore, we focus on the need for flexible behaviour regulation for
open agent-based systems, which must be designed with a focus on techniques that an-
ticipate and respond to the potential for erroneous or malicious behaviour. This requires
an ability to reason about complex overall system operation, resulting from individual
agent interactions, in support of mechanisms for control and management of systems
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as a whole. We argue that this, in turn, demands an understanding of how motivations,
organisations, norms and trust (among others) relate to each other, and how, in combi-
nation, they may give rise to effective and efficient systems.
The paper begins in Section 2 by reviewing a framework for characterising societies
or systems along dimensions involved in flexible behaviour regulation.Then, in Sections
3, 4 and 5, it expands on the role of, and requirements for, organisations, norms and
trust in such systems. Section 6 then introduces two distinct example applications, both
driven by real-world needs, illustrating how the different aspects of the framework are
relevant. Finally, the paper ends with broader conclusions.
2 Motivations, Organisations, Norms and Trust
As has been articulated elsewhere [16], much of computing, especially AI, can be con-
ceptualised as taking place at the knowledge level, with computational activity being
defined in terms of what to do, or goals. In this view, an agent’s concern is taken to be
the task of determining which actions to take to bring these goals about, yet the underly-
ing motivation behind these goals, the why rather than the how, is not often considered.
Despite being neglected, such motivation can have important and substantial influence
over the way in which goals are achieved. As is generally accepted, goals specify what
must be achieved but do not specify how; in this sense, they allow individual agents
to decide for themselves how best to achieve them. Although this provides freedom in
problem-solving, it provides little by way of direction or meta-level control that may be
valuable in determining how best to achieve overarching aims. Motivations address this
both by providing the reasons for the goal, and by offering constraints on how the goal
might best be achieved when faced with alternative courses of action [15].
In this context, motivations are the starting point for considering flexible behaviour
regulation, since they characterise the nature of the agents involved: at extreme points,
whether they are malevolent or benign. Thus agents may be well integrated members
of a system or society, cooperating with others when requested to do so, participating
effectively in joint ventures, and contributing to the good of the whole. Alternatively,
they may be malicious, seeking to take advantage of others, by requesting cooperation
but not providing it, by taking the benefits provided by a society without contributing
to its success, or they may simply be incompetent or unable to deliver.
Depending on the nature of such motivations, various mechanisms may be required
to ensure effective system operation. For example, in cases where there is a prevalence
of benign behaviour from individual agents, resulting from their motivations, there is
less risk in interacting with agents because they will generally seek to cooperate without
malicious intention. There is thus less risk in trusting others, since defection (which
occurs when agents renege on their agreements with others) is unlikely; indeed, agents
that are unwilling to trust others may miss opportunities for cooperation because of this.
Moreover, in these situations, the use of excessive regulation through strict enforcement
of system or societal rules (or norms) may hinder agent interactions to such a degree
that cooperation is ineffective. Here, it is most appropriate to allow free reign to the full
range of behaviours with little constraint, since malicious actions are unlikely, and the
effort that might be expended on introducing stricter regulation may be wasted.
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However, in cases where agents are less likely to be benign, some form of behaviour
regulation is needed, either through constraints imposed by organisational structure and
norms (limiting what is possible for agents to do) or through careful analysis of potential
cooperation partners through an analysis of trust and reputation. (Here, trust is taken to
be an individual’s direct assessment of the reliability of another based on direct inter-
actions with it, while reputation is an indirect assessment relying on the assessment of
third parties, based on their interactions.) In the former case (when constraints are im-
posed by the organisational structure and norms), trust may be less important, since the
system is heavily regulated through strict norms and enforcement. This is characteristic
of the electronic institutions approach of several researchers (e.g., [6,8]) in which agents
do not have the possibility of violating norms. However, despite this, if agents are less
willing to trust others, then the possibility for taking advantage of opportunities in terms
of cooperation may be ruled out. In the latter case, (when constraints are imposed by
placing less trust in agents with poor reputation), we have a prevalence of agents with
malicious motivations but their effectiveness is curtailed because of the care taken in
determining cooperation partners. Here, if there is little organisational structure and lax
enforcement of norms, there is a high likelihood that agents may defect, and since there
is little protection from societal or system regulation, the role of trust is vital. Typically,
agents should place very little trust in others in these situations.
In essence, this discussion characterises the axes of a three-dimensional space, de-
scribed in [16], and illustrated in Figure 1, that identifies different types of systems or
societies. More specifically, the x-axis represents motivations, with an increase in the
value of x representing a prevalence of malicious motivations, indicating that agents
are more likely to defect if they see more utility in alternative interactions. The y-axis
represents organisational constraints, norms, and their enforcement, with an increase
in value indicating the prevalence of stricter organisational structure, norms and en-
forcement. This can constrain the motivations of agents and prevent them from acting
maliciously if they intend to do so. Finally, the z-axis represents trust, with an increase
indicating an increase in the trust that agents place in others and, therefore, an increase
in willingness to cooperate with others. In the figure, eight points in the space (at the
vertices) are labelled by a circled letter, indicating different types of society or system.
As indicated above, societies A, B, E and F largely involve agents with benign mo-
tivations, so that the levels of organisational structure, norm enforcement and trust are
less important, but societies C, D, G and H are more interesting. For example, C involves
agents with malicious motivations, a lack of trust and lax organisational constraints, so
that it is likely to be very inefficient. Society G uses strict organisational constraints to
mitigate against these malicious motivations, society D uses a lack of trust to avoid po-
tentially problematic interactions, and society H uses both. Each of these cases has been
discussed in more detail above, but we have not yet provided a substantial consideration
of the different axes of this space, which we do next.
3 Organisations
As computational systems increasingly comprise many tens or even hundreds of inter-
connected and interacting components, whether they be in a single physical location or
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Fig. 1. The interplay between norms, motivations and trust (adapted from [16])
distributed across geographically diverse areas, they are increasingly difficult to manage
in a manual fashion. One approach to overcoming these difficulties lies in the applica-
tion of organisational models to structure the interactions between the components.
Such organisations can be as simple as a hierarchy of authority or as complex as a
society containing sub-society structures.
One of the most basic forms of organisational structure is a hierarchy [9], which
naturally reflects structured relationships of authority or other subordinate relationships,
for example. Hierarchies are very simple organisations, and are commonly applied in
many fields because of their rigid structure and ease of understanding and use. In their
most basic form, hierarchies are similar to trees, or directed graphs, in which there are
nodes and edges connecting these nodes, but no cycles. Here, each node has an arbitrary
number of child nodes connected to it via edges.
Although the obvious way to structure a hierarchy is by means of authority (with
managers and employees or contractors in the business domain, and with commanders,
sub-commanders and regular troops in the military), in fact this attribute could be some-
thing entirely different. In particular, it is this, whatever it may be, that determines the
ordering of the hierarchy. For example, instead of authority, we might use time of exe-
cution as the ordering attribute in the case of a workflow hierarchy (e.g., [11]), which is
a decomposition of a task into smaller sub-tasks, each node being a different sub-task.
Such a hierarchy is needed because some of the sub-tasks may need to be executed be-
fore others can be started. Taking Figure 2 as an illustration of this type of hierarchy,
if sub-task A must be executed before sub-task B, then A is the parent node of B. If
sub-task C also cannot be executed until A is completed but it does not matter if B and
C are executed sequentially or in parallel, then they may be siblings (that is to say that
they are both children of the same parent). The direction of the edges shows the order in
which the tasks must be completed, so in our particular application the root node must
be executed first, followed by its children, and so on.
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Fig. 2. A simple hierarchy
Similarly, as indicated above, we can have hierarchies that represent the authority of
some entities over others, for example in the case of an employer’s authority over an
employee or a sergeant’s authority over a private in the military. In this case, therefore,
assuming the same graph from Figure 2, the direction of the edges reflects the order of
importance or seniority in the hierarchy.
Importantly, such structures may provide constraints over interaction or communi-
cation. For example, one node in a hierarchy can only communicate with, and can only
receive messages from, nodes to which it is connected. In Figure 2, node A can send and
receive messages to and from node B, and vice versa. Conversely, A is not permitted to
send and receive direct messages to node D, since they are not directly connected, and
all communication must take place through the intermediary, node C.
Such structures can also aid control of a system. For example, in our hierarchy, the
apex (root) node is the ultimate controller of the system, delegating tasks down the hi-
erarchy. Nodes lower in the hierarchy send data produced lower down the hierarchy to
inform subsequent decisions about the control of the system. In this way, the nodes in
the system act as filters for communication: as data is passed up the hierarchy, each
agent filters the data that is propagated upwards to ensure that no single node is over-
whelmed with information. When decisions need to be made concerning information
passed up the hierarchy, they are made at the lowest level possible, by the node that
knows enough to be able to make the decision and has sufficient authority to execute
it. In this way, hierarchies provide simple but effective structures with clear and simple
protocols for communication.
Perhaps more interesting than simple static structures, however, are those that can
change or adapt in response to prevailing circumstances. The goal of self-organising
systems is to automatically form new organisation structures in situations when the
existing structure is no longer optimal. However, systems of the complexity we are
considering, comprising multiple interacting entities, can sometimes produce complex
and unexpected global behaviour. This phenomenon is known as emergence, which
refers to a novel macro-level situation that arises dynamically from the interactions
between parts of the system at the micro-level. Here, the behaviours of the individual
parts of the system can be fully specified or observed, but the interactions between these
parts give rise to an unexpected and unpredictable macro-level behaviour.
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4 Norms
More generally, the notion of a society can be taken to cover a group of individual
agents, bound together in some fashion, through the adoption of an organisational struc-
ture, or rules to provide some structure arising from adherence to them. Such rules
(also labelled conventions, social laws or norms) impose constraints on a population so
that agents know both how they should act and what behaviour to expect from others.
However, they are only valuable if used effectively; Fitoussi and Tennenholtz [7], for
example, suggests that the balance between individual objectives and norms is criti-
cal, because norms must be sufficiently restrictive to have the desired effect for which
they are applied, but must also be sufficiently flexible so that all objectives are equally
feasible.
Along these lines, Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck [13] provide a more specific definition
of norms within their normative framework. According to them, norms facilitate mech-
anisms to drive the behaviour of agents, especially in those cases where their behaviour
affects other agents. Norms can be characterised by their prescriptiveness, sociality, and
social pressure. In other words, a norm tells an agent how to behave (prescriptiveness) in
situations where more than one agent is involved (sociality) and since it is expected that
norms may often conflict with the personal interests of some agents, socially acceptable
mechanisms to force agents to comply with norms are needed (social pressure).
4.1 Norm Enforcement
Since agents are autonomous, compliance with norms is not guaranteed, but violation,
or non-compliance, of norms, can have negative effects on a society as a whole. As a
result, there is a need to provide some means of encouraging compliance, which is typ-
ically achieved through the use of sanctions. In this view, the potential for sanctions to
be imposed on a norm violator can be seen as norm enforcement, since agents must take
into consideration the possibility of receiving some punishment if they violate norms.
The issue of using sanctions to enforce norms has already been addressed, for example,
by Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al. [14], who define the notion of interlocking norms. Here, two
norms are interlocking if satisfying or violating one triggers the activation of the other.
The first norm is the primary norm, and the second is the secondary norm. Lo´pez y
Lo´pez et al. suggest applying the notion of interlocking norms to norm enforcement by
specifying that reward or punishment norms are considered as secondary norms for the
primary norms that the rewards or punishments are assigned to.
In this view, de Pinninck et al. [5] suggest the use of sanctions as a means of dis-
couraging norm violation in Gnutella, a peer-to-peer file sharing application. Here, the
system operates by different peers searching for files hosted by others and downloading
them, and relies on the assumption that peers will both share and download. However,
some may join the network and download files without contributing to the society by not
sharing their own files. To prevent this problem of allowing peers to consume services
without providing any of their own, de Pinninck et al. suggest adding a norm specify-
ing that any agent that needs to download a file should share some files with others. If
agents violate this norm, the violator is ostracised so that no other member of the soci-
ety interacts with it and, as a result, it is denied access to the network’s resources. In this
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case, ostracising the violator is accomplished through the spread of negative reputation
across the network.
4.2 Norm Emergence
From the description of de Pinninck’s model, it is not clear if the norm itself is explic-
itly represented or merely implicit in the behaviour of agents as a result of attempting
to generate the desired results. Along similar lines, Axelrod [3] proposes a game and
undertakes experiments to illuminate the process of norm establishment (and norm col-
lapse), when a norm arises through the guided behaviour of a group of agents. In his
norms game and metanorms game, punishments are applied to agents who do not com-
ply with norms, thus reducing their utility. However, because these punishments alone
turn out not to be adequate, metanorms are introduced as secondary norms that help
to enforce compliance of primary norms by applying punishments to agents that do
not punish norm violators. Having integrated metanorms in his experiments, the results
show that all runs end with a population that always complies with norms, so that norms
always emerge when metanorms are used.
4.3 Norm Processing
In addition to these aspects, there are several other processes involved in the use of
norms in open systems. Here, for completeness, we briefly outline the most important,
including norm recognition, norm adoption and decision making. Norm recognition
refers to the process by which an agent identifies a norm, or whether what might be
taken to be a norm is, in fact, some other form of social input. For example, Andrighetto
et al. [1] claim that the norm recogniser plays a very important role within the agent
reasoning cycle in their EMIL-A architecture. When an agent recognises a new norm,
it accepts it if it believes the norm concerns, or is directed towards, its behaviour. This
is known as norm adoption. Conte et al. [4] state that an agent adopts a norm only if
it believes that this norm helps, either in a direct or indirect way, to achieve one of
the agent’s goals. Based on this, the agent forms a normative goal that results from its
decision to adopt the norm, but it does not make the decision to comply with this norm.
Decision making is a critical phase of normative reasoning, as an agent decides within
this phase if it is going to comply with a norm. Whatever the decision, it might have
a major impact on behaviour. If the agent complies with the norm, some of its goals
might conflict with the norm and, as a result, the agent will not be able to achieve any
of these conflicting goals. On the other hand, if the agent violates the norm, then some
punishments may be applied to the agent, which in turn can affect the achievement of
some of its goals.
5 Trust
The use of norms in open computational systems can be extremely valuable, but without
appropriate mechanisms to encourage compliance with them, they can become useless.
This raises two important issues. The first, which is concerned with the nature of reg-
ulation in a society — how agents take decisions about norm compliance, and efforts
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to encourage compliance, through enforcement and the severity of sanctions — is one
we have largely outlined above. The second, which relies on the general levels of com-
pliance in a society — in determining to what extent agents should be concerned that
others may cooperate with them or defect (either because agents are more willing to
defect in pursuit of more utility somewhere else or because there is uncertainty about
whether agents can achieve the task) — requires a consideration of the third dimension
of behaviour regulation, trust and reputation.
In particular, open multi-agent systems consist of a large number of interacting au-
tonomous agents; each may have its own goals and may act to maximise its own benefit.
Thus, in such environments, there is a challenge for agents to choose the most reliable
interaction partner among many possible available. To cope with this challenge, many
trust and reputation models have been introduced, enabling agents to calculate the trust-
worthiness of their potential partners, and then to choose the most trustworthy partner
to interact with. By doing so, agents can maximise the chance that the interaction will
achieve its potential benefits.
For example, TRAVOS [23] is a trust and reputation model for agent-based virtual
organisations that computes the level of trust an agent (the truster) has in another agent
(the trustee). More precisely, the trustworthiness of the trustee from the truster’s per-
spective is the expected probability that the former will fulfil its obligations towards
the latter in an interaction. The estimation of this expected probability is based on the
outcomes of the previous direct interactions of the truster with the trustee, with each
interaction being evaluated as either successful (the trustee fulfilled the agreed obliga-
tions) or unsuccessful (the trustee did not do so). Each calculated trust value is associ-
ated with a confidence level, which increases with the increased number of the observed
outcomes.
When the confidence in the calculated trust value is below a pre-specified threshold,
which means that there is a lack of personal experience between the evaluating agent
and the agent being evaluated, the former depends on the latter’s reputation to evaluate
its trustworthiness. This reputation is obtained by combining the experiences (provided
as outcome observations) the other agents had with the trustee and, as a result, the eval-
uating agent will have a larger number of observations with which to assess the trustee.
Moreover, to cope with the problem of inaccurate third-party experiences (provided,
for example, by misleading reputation sources), the truster estimates the reliability of
each reputation source depending on the accuracy of its past opinions, and then uses
this reliability value to decrease the role of unreliable opinions in the calculation of the
trustee’s reputation.
6 Case Studies
Given the above view of how we can understand the need for behaviour regulation in
open agent systems, and the analysis of the relevant characteristics or dimensions that
make up the space of such systems, we can move to consider how they are relevant in
real cases. In this section, therefore, we introduce two case studies, one addressing a
fully developed system, and the other addressing an application that would benefit from
an analysis in terms of the concepts described in this paper. The first is concerned with
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the need to provide contract-enabled e-business systems, to provide guarantees over
service delivery between partners, based on several different motivating use cases [10],
and illustrating the value of flexible behaviour regulation in normative settings. The
second is focussed on a healthcare application for linking primary care providers to
clinical researchers, showing the need for trust mechanisms and robust organisations in
this domain.
6.1 Electronic Contracting
The CONTRACT project, created to explore multiple aspects of contract-based systems,
developed a comprehensive framework for the creation, management [19] and monitor-
ing [18] of electronic contracts. Here, electronic contracts are viewed as comprising sets
of norms, i.e. statements of expected behaviour, usually expressed in terms of deontic
concepts such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions. Development of the frame-
work was informed by a series of case studies concerned with insurance settlement,
aerospace aftermarkets [17] and certification testing, described by Jakob et al. [10].
The CONTRACT framework is a conceptual model for specifying applications using
electronic contracting. The general architecture that was built using this framework
provides an instantiation of relevant aspects of contract administration, through service-
oriented middleware and multi-agent design patterns. Figure 3 illustrates the overall
structure of the framework and architecture, which can be seen as a set of models and
specifications, and comprising a methodology for adapting application designs to utilise
electronic contracts. The primary component is the framework, at the top, which is the
conceptual structure used to describe a contract-based system, including the contracts
themselves and the agents to which they apply. Each level in the figure provides support
for the components below it. Arrows indicate where one model influences or provides
input to another.
Given a particular application, its framework specification enables other important
information to be derived. For example, off-line verification mechanisms can check
whether the contracts to be established satisfy particular properties, such as whether
they can be achieved given the possible reachable world states. In turn, those states that
are critical to observe during execution to ensure appropriate behaviour can be deter-
mined. In this context, critical states indicate whether, for example, an obligation is
fulfilled or fulfillable, (e.g., achieved, failed, in danger of not being fulfilled, etc.).
A state-based description, along with the deontic and epistemic implications of the
specified contracts, can then be used to verify a system either off-line, using a model-
checking approach [12], or with run-time monitoring [18].
Using the CONTRACT framework as a starting point, it is then possible to deter-
mine suitable processes for administration of the electronic contracts, including es-
tablishment, updating, termination, renewal, and so on. Such processes may include
observation of the system, so that contractual obligations can be enforced or otherwise
effectively managed, and these processes depend on the critical states identified above.
Once suitable application processes are identified, we can also specify the roles that
agents play within them, the components that should be part of agents to allow them
to manage their contracts, and the contract documents themselves. An XML-based
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language was developed to provide a concrete realisation of contract specifications us-
ing the framework, allowing contracts to be communicated and negotiated over [20].
All this provides the basic infrastructure required for establishing flexible behaviour
regulation among agents or service providers in open systems, through a normative
framework for agreeing contracts that impose structural relationships on the agents in
the system, and through mechanisms for providing guarantees over their behaviour. In
this context, their is an implicit suggestion that agents may not be benign, which is why
contractual agreements are required.
Contracts. More specifically, the agreements between agents are formally described
in electronic contracts, which document obligations, permissions and prohibitions (col-
lectively clauses) on agents. Agents bound by contract clauses are said to be contract
parties, and a contract specifies contract roles, which are fulfilled by contract parties, so
that clauses apply to specific contract roles. Importantly, each of these clauses represents
a norm, which can be interpreted here as socially derived prescriptions specifying that
some set of agents (the norms targets) may, or must, or may not, perform some action,
or see that some state of affairs occurs. As discussed earlier, norms can be understood
as regulating the behaviour of agents: this is their role when encoded in contracts.
As indicated earlier, norms are social constructs, and it is meaningless to consider
norms independently of their social aspect. This is because norms are imposed on the
target by some other entity (the imposer) which must be granted, via the society, some
power to impose the norm. Without this power, the norms target is free to ignore the
norms prescriptions. With the presence of this power, a penalty may be imposed on
an agent violating a norm. These penalties take the form of additional norms, giving
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certain agents within a society permission to impose penalties (or obliging them to
do so). This provides the means to establish the strict regulation that may be required
without guarantees of benign behaviour. We assume that a contract is also made up
of various descriptive elements, for example, stating which ontologies may be used to
explain the terms found within it.
Since norms may have normative force only in certain situations, we associate norms
with an activation condition. Norms are thus typically abstract, and are instantiated
when the norms activation condition holds. Once a norm has been instantiated, it re-
mains active, irrespective of its activation condition, until a specific expiration condi-
tion holds. When it occurs, the norm is assumed to no longer have normative force.
Finally, independent of these two conditions is the norm’s normative goal, which is
used to identify when the norm is violated (in the case of an obligation), or what the
agent is actually allowed to do (in the case of a permission). Obligations and permis-
sions are the two norm types on which our framework focuses. Like others (e.g., [24]),
we assume that additional norm types may be constructed from these basic types (e.g. a
prohibition could be seen as an obligation with a negated normative goal). Norms may
be activated, satisfied and discharged based on a number of factors including the status
of other norms, the state of the environment (and the actions performed by other agents
therein), and the status of contracts.
Contract Parties. Contracts in our system are agreed by agents, which are assumed
to be autonomous, pro-active, flexible (decision-making) and social, and agents engage
in contract-directed interactions to fulfil the clauses specified in a contract. Contract
interactions require a minimum of two agents fulfilling the role of participants. Some
applications may require contract-related processes to have certain properties, e.g. that
violations are acted on, or that the integrity of the contract documents is maintained.
These requirements lead to obligations on (and the creation and use of) administrative
parties, and contracts may document their required behaviour. We thus have two distinct
kinds of contract parties.
– Business Contract Party Agents for whom the contract is created: the obligations
on the business contract parties are largely concerned with the business of the ap-
plication.
– Administrative Contract Party Agents are required to ensure that the contract is
accessible, retains integrity and legitimacy, is monitored and enforced, and other
such administrative functions that ensure the contract has force. The obligations on
these agents relate to their administrative roles.
Enforcement. Two particular administrative contract party roles are those of observer
and manager [17]. The former detects whether the system enters a critical state (success,
violation, in danger of violation) with regard to a particular clause. A manager reacts on
the basis of observation, e.g. to inform a user of the problem, penalise a contract party in
some way, and so on. There may be several observers and managers for an application,
for example checking compliance on behalf of different users, and handling violations
in different ways.
One of the important aspects of the CONTRACT architecture in ensuring and en-
couraging compliance with a contract is the process of run-time monitoring [18]. Here,
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the key information available to third parties for this purpose consists of the messages
exchanged between agents, and these messages are first gathered by observer agents.
Monitors then receive the observations from observers that are explicitly entrusted by
all contract parties to accurately report on the state of the world, and determine their
status. The use of trusted observers ensures some degree of certainty that a norm is
reported as violated if and only if it has in actuality been violated, and thus provides
assurance that sanctions are only applied as and when appropriate. Once the status of
a norm is ascertained through the monitoring process, the decision of what actions are
to be taken is delegated to manager agents, which might apply sanctions for violations
and rewards for fulfilment, as appropriate.
6.2 ePCRN
The ePCRN (electronic Primary Care Research Network)1 is an infrastructure project
that seeks to connect healthcare (primary care) with clinical research by facilitating the
management of primary care clinical trials [2,22]. Clinical research is a vital resource
for continually improving healthcare [21]. The issues involved relate to patient privacy
and confidentiality, access to patient data across geographically distributed primary care
clinics, heterogeneity of electronic health record (EHR) systems and interfaces, and so
on, providing significant syntactic and semantic interoperability problems. The idea is
that clinical researchers should be able to generate interoperable queries that can be
submitted to all available clinics within the ePCRN network by adopting a Grid-based
framework for distributed information access.
Clinical patient information is stored in EHRs in individual clinics or repositories
(the record from several clinics combined into one repository), with other information
potentially coming directly from hospital information systems (e.g., laboratory results,
prescriptions, etc.). Each may have its own data format and interface. Researchers un-
dertaking clinical trials need to find eligible patients by searching through this data,
but preserving confidentiality and anonymity. As a result, they do not access the data
directly at this point, and send requests to local clinics to invite patients to participate
in studies, with only the local clinic being able to identify patients. Once patients are
recruited, data for each participant is collected; if the EHR data is needed, it can be
provided at this point, via secure or authorised access mechanisms. Finally, when the
results of the trials are available, relevant data may be fed back into the patient record,
but without repudiating the original unmodified record. A key challenge here is to en-
able access to patient data and maintain patient confidentiality; this requires a robust
yet flexible confidentiality and security framework that enables healthcare providers to
control their data sharing policy and benefit from clinical research output. Importantly,
such a framework must both conform to organisational data and process flow and en-
force system and local policy measures.
In the context of the three-dimensional space, it is clear that the organisational struc-
ture of, the relationships between, and the rules governing the researchers, the primary
clinics, the practitioners and the patients, imposes significant constraints on what is pos-
sible. This is not simply a matter of efficiency and effectiveness, but is a requirement
1 http://www.epcrn.bham.ac,uk
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placed on the handling of data both legally and ethically. From a different perspective,
the individuals involved must have strong trust in others to ensure that data is correct,
that data will not be mis-used, and that patient records will not be modified inappropri-
ately. At the same time, since all parties can be assumed to have benign motivations,
and since the system is designed to impose the organisational constraints described, the
levels of trust required are likely to be relatively high. Nevertheless, the relationship
between the different axes described earlier in the paper should be clear.
7 Conclusions
In open agent systems comprising multiple autonomous agents, agent behaviour cannot
be guaranteed, resulting in the possibility that overall system operation may be inef-
fective or inefficient. For this reason, there has been an increasing amount of research
devoted to establishing appropriate mechanisms to encourage or enforce socially ac-
ceptable (and even valuable) behaviour on the part of individual agents. Drawing on
analogous mechanisms in human societies, such mechanisms include those to establish,
monitor and manage trust among agents that need to work together, based on experi-
ence of their previous interactions. However, in the absence of strong trust relationships
to enable effective interaction in dynamic and open environments, some form of soci-
etal regulation must also be considered. In this respect, organisations and norms have
been proposed as a means of mitigating the consequences of action when these trust
relationships are absent.
In relation to these concerns, this paper has sought to elaborate on an earlier frame-
work for characterising and contrasting different types of systems and societies as a
means for understanding the requirements for behaviour regulation of the component
agents. It considered systems with a prevalence of stricter organisations, norms and en-
forcement, those with agents inclined to behave maliciously, and those in which trust
in agents is higher or lower. Given this analysis, the different dimensions of the frame-
work were considered in more detail, and illustrated in relation to two distinct real-
world case studies in which the issues raised are important factors in successful system
design and development. The key message is that while the identified characteristics
and techniques have been considered across a range of different research efforts, the
relationship between them must also be analysed and understood in order to determine
which techniques are appropriate in different circumstances.
References
1. Andrighetto, G., Campenni, M., Conte, R., Paolucci, M.: On the immergence of norms: a
normative agent architecture. In: Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium on Social and Orga-
nizational Aspects of Intelligence (2007)
2. Arvanitis, T.N., Taweel, A., Zhao, L., Delaney, B.C., Peterson, K.A., Speedie, S.M., Sim,
I., Weissman, J., Fontaine, P., Lange, C., Janowiec, M., Stone, J.: Supporting e-trials over
distributed networks: A tool for capturing randomised control trials (RCT) eligibility criteria
using the national cancer institutes (NCI) enterprise vocabulary services (EVS). Technology
and Health Care 15(5), 298–299 (2007)
112 M. Luck et al.
3. Axelrod, R.: An evolutionary approach to norms. The American Political Science Re-
view 80(4), 1095–1111 (1986)
4. Conte, R., Castelfranchi, C., Dignum, F.P.M.: Autonomous norm acceptance. In: Papadim-
itriou, C., Singh, M.P., Mu¨ller, J.P. (eds.) ATAL 1998. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1555, pp. 99–112.
Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
5. Perreau de Pinninck, A., Sierra, C., Schorlemmer, W.M.: Distributed norm enforcement:
Ostracism in open multi-agent systems. In: Casanovas, P., Sartor, G., Casellas, N., Rubino,
R. (eds.) Computable Models of the Law. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 4884, pp. 275–290. Springer,
Heidelberg (2008)
6. Esteva, M., Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J.-A., Sierra, C., Garcia, P., Arcos, J.-L.: On the formal spec-
ification of electronic institutions. In: Sierra, C., Dignum, F.P.M. (eds.) AgentLink 2000.
LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1991, pp. 126–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
7. Fitoussi, D., Tennenholtz, M.: Choosing social laws for multi-agent systems: Minimality and
simplicity. Artificial Intelligence 119(1-2), 61–101 (2000)
8. Garcı´a-Camino, A., Noriega, P., Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J.A.: Implementing norms in electronic
institutions. In: Thompson, S., Pechoucek, M., Steiner, D. (eds.) Proceedings of the Fourth
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 667–
673. ACM Press, New York (2005)
9. Horling, B., Lesser, V.: A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms. The Knowledge
Engineering Review 19(4), 281–316 (2005)
10. Jakob, M., Pechoucek, M., Cha´bera, J., Miles, S., Luck, M., Oren, N., Kollingbaum, M.,
Holt, C., Vazquez-Salceda, J., Storms, P., Dehn, M.: Case studies for contract-based systems.
In: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, pp. 55–62 (2008)
11. Kota, R., Gibbins, N., Jennings, N.: Self-organising agent organisations. In: Proceedings of
the Eighth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp.
797–804 (2009)
12. Lomuscio, A., Qu, H., Solanki, M.: Towards verifying contract regulated service composi-
tion. In: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Web Services (ICWS 2008),
Beijing, China, pp. 255–261 (2008)
13. Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F., Luck, M.: Modelling norms for autonomous agents. In: Cha´vez, E.,
Favela, J., Mejı´a, M., Oliart, A. (eds.) Proceedings of The Fourth Mexican Conference on
Computer Science, pp. 238–245. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2003)
14. Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F., Luck, M., d’Inverno, M.: A normative framework for agent-based sys-
tems. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 12(2-3), 227–250 (2006)
15. Luck, M., d’Inverno, M.: Motivated behaviour for goal adoption. In: Zhang, C., Lukose, D.
(eds.) DAI 1998. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1544, pp. 58–73. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
16. Luck, M., Munroe, S., Lopez y Lopez, F., Ashri, R.: Trust and norms for interaction. In: Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man & Cybernetics, pp. 1944–
1949. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2004)
17. Meneguzzi, F.R., Miles, S., Luck, M., Holt, C., Smith, M., Oren, N., Faci, N., Kollingbaum,
M., Modgil, S.: Electronic contracting in aircraft aftercare: A case study. In: Berger, M.,
Burg, B., Nishiyama, S. (eds.) Proceedings of the Seventh International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Industry and Applications Track, pp. 63–70
(2008)
18. Modgil, S., Faci, N., Meneguzzi, F., Oren, N., Miles, S., Luck, M.: A Framework for Mon-
itoring Agent-Based Normative Systems. In: Proceedings of the 8th International Confer-
ence on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2009), Budapest, Hungary,
pp. 153–160. IFAAMAS (May 2009)
Flexible Behaviour Regulation in Agent Based Systems 113
19. Oren, N., Panagiotidi, S., Va´zquez-Salceda, J., Modgil, S., Luck, M., Miles, S.: Towards a
formalisation of electronic contracting environments. In: Hu¨bner, J.F., Matson, E., Boissier,
O., Dignum, V. (eds.) COIN@AAMAS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5428, pp. 156–171. Springer,
Heidelberg (2009)
20. Panagiotidi, S., Vazquez-Salceda, J., Alvarez-Napagao, S., Ortega-Martorell, S., Willmott,
S., Confalonieri, R., Storms, P.: Intelligent contracting agents language. In: Behaviour Regu-
lation in MAS, AISB 2008 Convention Communication, Interaction and Social Intelligence,
pp. 49–55 (2008)
21. Sim, I., Olasov, B., Carini, S.: An ontology of randomized controlled trials for evidence-
based practice: content specification and evaluation using the competency decomposition
method. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 37(2), 108–119 (2004)
22. Speedie, S.M., Taweel, A., Sim, I., Arvanitis, T., Delaney, B., Peterson, K.: The primary
care research object model (PCROM): A computable information model for practice-based
primary care research. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 15(5),
661–670 (2008)
23. Teacy, W.T.L., Patel, J., Jennings, N.R., Luck, M.: Travos: Trust and reputation in the con-
text of inaccurate information sources. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 12(2),
183–198 (2006)
24. von Wright, G.H.: Deontic logic. Mind 60, 1–15 (1951)
